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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 JAKARTA 001819

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SUBJECT: INDONESIA-U.S. POLITICA-MILITARY TALKS

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RAYMOND RICHHART. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. and Indonesian delegations held a day of political-military talks February 1 to explore expanded bilateral cooperation following the U.S. decision in November to end restrictions on military-to-military relations. The U.S. delegation, led by Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, proposed that the U.S. and Indonesia focus security cooperation on interoperability; improvement of capabilities of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) for disaster relief, maritime security, and regional stability; and defense reform and increased civilian control of TNI. The U.S. team briefed on the U.S. relationship with China, the Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR), the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Article 98 agreements. The Indonesian delegation, led by Harry Purwanto, Director for North and Central America in the Department of Foreign Affairs, emphasized in its presentation on regional perspectives and security priorities the importance of safeguarding Indonesia's territorial integrity and Indonesia's "active commitment to world social justice and peace." He described ASEAN's contribution to regional security and Indonesia's commitment to strengthen the organization.

¶2. (C) A/S Hillen, when reviewing bilateral political-military relations, assured the Indonesian delegation that the U.S. had lifted all sanctions. Indonesia's hard work to build democratic institutions and reform TNI, and the reaction to cooperation between Indonesia and the U.S. during tsunami relief efforts, had greatly facilitated the U.S. decision. However, many of the issues that caused friction in the past remained and both sides should exercise caution that issues not "bubble up" again. BG Abdul Cholik, Director of International Cooperation at the Department of Defense (DEPHAN), emphasized Indonesia's internal security and stability when he briefed on Indonesia's defense priorities. Among the "general policy descriptions" to fulfill these interests were improvement of TNI professionalism, development of national strategic industries, establishment of early warning capability, and development of "minimum regular force, reserve and supporting forces." Procurement of weapons should accord with the GOI political directive that TNI develop the "minimum essential force" necessary to address threats.

¶3. (C) A/S Hillen underscored the value of the opportunity the talks provided for the two delegations to learn from each other, and emphasized that the two countries should maintain momentum, talk often, maintain transparency and exchange information on what is happening in the field. He also

stressed that the U.S. and Indonesia should now work to find common approaches to global problems -- for example, energy, freedom of movement, Iran and DPRK non-proliferation. To maintain support for a normal military-to-military relationship, the two countries must also achieve concrete results to demonstrate that cooperation pays dividends and that we have moved forward and crossed a threshold. Purwanto responded that bilateral relations had "never been better" and that Indonesia was now duty-bound to fulfill the promise made possible by the window that the U.S. had opened.

Purwanto opened the door to possible "PSI-like" cooperation with the U.S. and a mechanism other than an Article 98 agreement to address U.S. non-surrender concerns. End Summary.

¶4. (SBU) Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, February 1 led a Washington delegation to political-military talks with Indonesia that included BG Jeffrey Remington, JCS/J5; LTC Phil Clemons, JCS/J5; Mr. Peter Ipsen, OSD/ISA; and Jane Bocklage, DOS PM/RSAT. Embassy Jakarta DCM Lewis Amselem, DATT COL Joseph Judge, ODC Chief Kenneth Comer, and POL Officer Pepper Richhart joined the delegation. Harry Purwanto, Director for North and Central America in the Department of Foreign Affairs, organized and led the talks for the Indonesian government. He was joined by officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Defense, TNI Headquarters, TNI's Intelligence Agency (BAIS), Indonesian National Police (POLRI), National Intelligence Body (BIN), and Department of Communications.

Introductory Remarks

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United States

¶5. (C) A/S Hillen described the importance the U.S. placed on the talks and told the Indonesian delegation that the U.S. wanted to cement unbreakable ties between the two countries and maintain the momentum achieved by the Administration's decision to normalize the military-to-military relationship in November, 2005. 2005 constituted a seminal year for the bilateral relationship and the end of the "embargo" had allowed the U.S. to move forward. Such progress only became possible because of the significant progress Indonesia had made in areas of accountability, cooperation and democratization -- issues very important to the U.S. A/S Hillen stressed that the U.S. Congress and the Administration would continue to focus on those critical areas and would look for ways the U.S. could help Indonesia continue such reform.

¶6. (SBU) A/S Hillen said that U.S. proposed to focus security cooperation efforts on three broad principles:

- 1) Interoperability;
- 2) Improvement of TNI capabilities, in particular for disaster response and engagement to promote maritime security and regional stability;
- 3) Defense reform and increased civilian control over the military.

A/S Hillen reiterated that a very positive air now existed in the Pentagon and in the State Department that could issue in a new era of cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia.

Indonesia

¶7. (C) Purwanto thanked the U.S. delegation for America's

attention and interest. He explained that after embracing democracy, Indonesia had reached a crucial point at which the government must give strong proof to the Indonesian people that democracy was the right choice. This was not easy, he added. Purwanto described the transnational problems facing Indonesia: illegal fishing, logging, illicit drugs, trafficking in persons. He explained the challenges posed by Indonesia's extensive borders and coastline. He said that because of Indonesia's limited resources, the GOI welcomed assistance from the United States based on equality and mutual respect. He expressed Indonesia's willingness to reinforce common values, reduce misperceptions and synergize efforts.

U.S. Views on China, GDPR, GOPI, PSI, Article 98

U.S.-China relationship

¶ 18. (SBU) A/S Hillen described the bilateral U.S.-China relationship as complex and one in which both partners needed to do more to understand the other. He said the U.S. wanted for China to succeed, noted that China was one of the largest trading partners for the U.S. and stressed that geopolitical competition with China was not inevitable. He noted that the U.S. wanted a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan/China relationship and had concerns regarding the lack of transparency in the military and China's military buildup in Southeast China.

¶ 19. (C) Purwanto responded that China made itself felt in Southeast Asia, adding that India had also a significant presence in the region. Southeast Asia shared borders with both; if China increased its military capacity, it must transit the Southeast Asian region wherever it went. Likewise, as India expanded, it would want markets and access to Southeast Asia. Purwanto asked for U.S. views on the consequences for Southeast Asia of increased Chinese and Indian power. Southeast Asian countries were concerned regarding the regional balance of power, he noted, adding that the region's "vision" had been good when it established ASEAN to avoid conflicts in the region.

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¶ 10. (C) A/S Hillen responded that the U.S. had underway an important initiative to build a new strategic relationship with India, which included defense, political and economic cooperation. He explained that U.S. policies toward India, China and Southeast Asia were developed on their own terms; while interconnected, these policies dealt with countries on their own terms -- and Indonesia deserved that the U.S. do this with it as well. Geopolitics matter -- relations with China and Southeast Asia depended on each country's "weight."

This presented opportunities for Indonesia to play an important role. BG Remington added that the U.S. and much of the world had engaged China to encourage transparency; the U.S. hoped its engagement would encourage China not to develop a military force that would challenge the sea lines of communication in Southeast Asia. The U.S. wanted by engaging China to create a responsible partner; if China were to threaten the region it would put at risk political structures and economies in the region.

Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR)

¶ 11. (SBU) A/S Hillen explained that the U.S. was working to transform its foreign policy and security apparatus. He noted changes in the Department of Defense and efforts in the GDPR to transform the U.S. force position. He described efforts within the State Department to shift the focus of activity and positions from Europe to the Middle East, Africa

and Asia. BG Remington briefed on the GDPR.

¶12. (C) Purwanto observed that the threats the U.S. now faces were non-traditional -- for example, terrorism -- and the U.S. could not prevail with force alone. Had the U.S. changed its strategy when deploying? Was the U.S. preparing for old conflicts or had it developed a new paradigm to fight terrorism and to help others? A/S Hillen agreed with Purwanto that non-traditional threats required new responses, and that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for them. He added that the war on terror had political, economic, informational and operational dimensions; success depended on political legitimacy and economic development. In one of the most important lines in the QDR the Pentagon recognized the importance of non-military aspects of conflicts.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)

¶13. (SBU) A/S Hillen described the genesis of GPOI in the 2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit, and explained that the initiative's five-year goals are to: 1) train and equip global peacekeeping troops; 2) support deployment of peacekeepers through assistance for lift and sustainability; 3) increase gendarme and police capabilities. He noted that Thailand, Mongolia, Malaysia and Bangladesh were already GPOI partners.

¶14. (SBU) Purwanto responded that Indonesia had established a new task force at the Department of Foreign Affairs and a training center to increase Indonesian PKO capabilities. He noted that Indonesia since independence had contributed to peacekeeping forces under UN auspices in many parts of the world. The new peacekeeping center would encourage Indonesian scientists and others to assist in Indonesian PKO efforts; they would also focus on development of equipment. He noted that Indonesia until now sent peacekeepers only to operations under UN authority, and had not yet considered other frameworks.

¶15. (SBU) A/S Hillen assured Purwanto that GPOI did not compete with UN peacekeeping activities. He explained that the U.S. had wanted the UN take over the PKO in Darfur, Sudan, but that the OAU currently had the force there. The UN could be one tool, but the U.S. had seen many examples -- the tsunami relief effort was one -- in which waiting for the UN

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to respond would have taken too much time.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

¶16. (C) A/S Hillen said Washington needed good news about Indonesia for the new mil-mil relationship to endure. The relationship involved mutual commitments. In that regard, the U.S. would like for Indonesia to join PSI. Doing so would send an "important and profound signal" to Congress and

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would help build mutual trust.

¶17. (C) Purwanto responded that the GOI appreciated the briefings on PSI given by visiting U.S. teams, but the GOI so far had not decided to participate. Because of the high value Indonesia placed on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the importance to Indonesia of maintaining its territorial integrity and borders, Indonesia did not want to join any arrangement it perceived not in line with UNCLOS.

¶18. (C) A/S Hillen said he appreciated GOI willingness to consider U.S. entreaties to join PSI, and emphasized that 95 percent of PSI activity would occur in port, not on the high seas, and UNCLOS would not come into play. He added that many participants in PSI are firm supporters of the rule of

law and they saw no contradiction between PSI and UNCLOS or their own national laws.

¶19. (C) Purwanto reiterated that Indonesia had long been known for its strong commitment in multilateral fora to non-proliferation and disarmament. Indonesia shared the U.S. commitment to "eradicate the bad guys" engaged in proliferation. Although Indonesia was not in a position to "join" PSI, would there be any possibility for Indonesia and the U.S. to develop a "different framework but still do everything in PSI without joining PSI," Purwanto asked. He added that "room for Indonesia to cooperate is still open."

¶20. (C) A/S Hillen responded that, in the end, finding an alternative to PSI would be better than doing nothing at all.

The U.S. and Indonesia should not confuse means and ends, and ends are important in this case. However, Indonesia may still want to consider PSI because means take on symbolism. In his trips to Congress to request funding for Indonesia, he wanted to describe Congress Indonesian commitments, shared commitments; PSI and other types of cooperation would matter.

The GOI should keep in mind activities we could undertake jointly to demonstrate to Congress and to the Indonesian Parliament that we are building and sharing trust and sacrifice in partnership with each other.

Non-Surrender Agreement or SOFA

¶21. (C) A/S Hillen urged Indonesia to conclude a non-surrender agreement or robust status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the U.S. He referred to past efforts to come to agreement on an Article 98 Agreement, said he understood the large number of issues and the complexity of reaching an agreement, but said that the U.S. and Indonesia should continue their dialogue on this issue. He noted that the Secretary would likely raise the issue during her visit to

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Indonesia. The U.S. deemed an agreement important for the sake of the relationship and A/S Hillen therefore requested the forbearance of the GOI to consider a non-surrender agreement with the U.S.

¶22. (C) Purwanto explained that having just embraced democracy, the Indonesian government must reflect the positions of all stakeholders -- and some oppose conclusion of an agreement that could facilitate impunity for human rights abuses. Further, because Indonesia is not a party to the Rome Statute, it need not consider a non-surrender arrangement. Under the Indonesian legal system, the government must have the approval of parliament for any agreement involving political, security or human rights issues. The GOI needed "time to digest" the U.S. offer before responding and presenting such an agreement to the Indonesian people. A/S Hillen repeated that the U.S. and Indonesia could also consider a robust and permanent SOFA. He noted, nevertheless, that over 100 countries had signed Article 98 agreements with the U.S. Purwanto suggested that it might be possible to address U.S. concerns through an agreement other than an Article 98 agreement, such as a SOFA.

Indonesian Regional Perspectives, Security Priorities

¶23. (C) Indonesian delegation head Purwanto emphasized in his presentation on regional perspectives and security priorities the importance of protecting Indonesia's territorial integrity and Indonesia's "active commitment to world social justice and peace." He mentioned Indonesian peacekeeping efforts in countries with internal conflicts (Cambodia and Southern Philippines) and GOI mediation efforts

¶124. (C) Purwanto explained that ASEAN had "re-energized itself for stronger cooperation in ASEAN and with its dialogue partners" to address issues such as counterterrorism, maritime security, infectious diseases, disaster relief. The original ASEAN members established the organization to end conflict in the region, and its success in doing so had allowed members to focus energies to resolving internal problems.

¶125. (C) Indonesia occupied a strategic location and remained a "relatively young archipelagic and littoral country," Purwanto said. Indonesia was in the early stages of assuming responsibility for maritime security and welcomed assistance from friendly countries. In the Malacca Strait, Indonesia had undertaken joint activities with other littoral states. Indonesia had established a new coordinating agency for maritime security, "BAKROKAMLA," within the Coordinating Ministry; members include representatives from Sea Communications, Coast Guard, and the Navy. User states were free to offer assistance "without being intrusive."

¶126. (C) Purwanto expressed appreciation for steps by the U.S. Administration to support democracy in Indonesia and to end restrictions on military-to-military relations. He noted that with the Armed Forces Law of 2004 civilian control over the military had been firmly established. He said that Indonesia wanted to "go past arms exports from the U.S." and sought closer collaboration to include joint development and co-production of weapons in Indonesia. He concluded that Indonesia had much left to do to reorganize its armed forces.

¶127. (C) The U.S. delegation asked about future developments in ASEAN. Purwanto said he believed that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could help with confidence building measures, through more dialogues, to prevent potential conflicts and build trust and stability in the region if connected to the Strait of Malacca. This could provide real and practical cooperation. Purwanto repeated the suggestion he made in the earlier session that Indonesia was willing to work with the U.S. outside the framework of PSI and was "looking for ways to build a mechanism" to do so.

Review of U.S.-Indonesia Pol-Mil Relations

¶128. (C) A/S Hillen opened the U.S. review of bilateral political-military relations by assuring the Indonesian delegation that the U.S. had lifted all sanctions. He emphasized that the President and Secretary had put their political reputations at stake by doing so. The U.S. was aided in its decision to normalize military relations by Indonesia's hard work and by the reaction to cooperation between Indonesia and the U.S. during tsunami relief efforts. However, many of the issues that caused friction in the past remained and both sides should exercise caution that issues not "bubble up" again. A/S Hillen suggested, for example, that there were some security units that the U.S. would be unable to work with. The Embassy had submitted a robust plan for increased military assistance to Indonesia, which the State Department supported. Several programs were available to bolster assistance, for example provision of excess defense articles (EDA). In the current fiscal year, USD 1 million was available for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and USD 792 thousand for IMET. Vetting of individuals/units receiving training remained a legal requirement. It may become necessary, as we map out the mil-mil relationship, to make some tough decision, A/S Hillen cautioned, because considerable congressional scrutiny remains.

¶129. (C) The Defense Resource Management Study Program could serve as an important tool for TNI reform, and could help the Administration demonstrate Indonesian seriousness in reform. The U.S. and Indonesia needed to address some logistical issues -- such as completion of an Access and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and a 505 Agreement -- as well. A/S Hillen noted that the defense cooperation ideas Purwanto had

proposed earlier seemed intriguing; cooperation could begin government-to-government and the two governments could subsequently press for industrial cooperation. ODC Chief LTC Comer noted that the Embassy had already set in motion discussion of an ACSA with the Indonesian Department of Defense (DEPHAN); BG Cholik responded DEPHAN Secretary General Syfrie Samsudin had concurred with conclusion of an

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ACSA. Purwanto observed that such practical considerations constituted the "heart of the matter," and asked for further details on a 505 Agreement, which Embassy officers promised to provide.

¶30. (C) BG Cholik asked whether the lifting of restrictions would be permanent, because this would affect planning and budgeting for the Defense Department and TNI. A/S Hillen replied that lifting of the "embargo" was permanent and no time limit applied. However, the two governments needed to "rush through the open window with good news and actions" to demonstrate progress in outstanding issues and the value of a normalized relationship. He repeated that the Administration would not revisit the decision, unless a major event -- to include human rights problems -- drove such a review. A/S Hillen reiterated that the Administration had moved past the decision to lift the embargo -- but significant scrutiny of the relationship would continue. This applied as well to vetting, done in accordance with the Leahy amendments, the application of which a number of critics of Administration policy would examine closely. The Administration would continue to push, but the better it could demonstrate concretely the wisdom of the decision to normalize, "the better off we will be." A/S Hillen added that at times disappointment would arise or decisions from the U.S. side would appear unfair; however, both sides must exercise caution and not risk the overall program by pushing through an activity that could jeopardize it.

¶31. (C) Purwanto said that Indonesia needed to guarantee the security and safety of its waters and would focus on maritime security. A gap in equipment -- particularly the lack of compatible equipment -- could hinder maritime security cooperation with other countries. Purwanto asked that U.S. ensure compatibility with army equipment for any equipment it provides for maritime security. Further, the U.S. (through the ICITAP program) has provided Indonesia's Maritime Police small boats, but that trained personnel remained inadequate; he asked that the U.S. consider additional training for trainers -- to include programs in the U.S. -- for the Maritime Police. A/S Hillen agreed with the importance of supporting Indonesia's maritime security efforts: this was clearly in U.S. security interests, given the importance of Southeast Asia; it helps deter aggression and enhance security; and it would improve interoperability, enabling Indonesian forces to work better among each other and with allies and partners.

Indonesian Defense Priorities

¶32. (C) BG Cholik, Director of International Cooperation at DEPHAN, emphasized Indonesia's internal security and stability when he briefed on Indonesia's defense priorities. The "threats and disturbances" to Indonesia he listed included "sea and air security threats" and international terrorism, but were far more focused on internal threats: separatism; radicalism; communal conflicts; destruction of the environment; natural disasters and their impact; international crime; illegal immigration. Cholik broadly sketched broad Indonesia's "national interest" as guaranteeing "the welfare of all of the Indonesian people who are within the 'unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI)' which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution."

¶33. (C) BG Cholik said Indonesia's "permanent strategic

"interest" was to "guard and protect the country's sovereignty and the unity of Indonesia and the country's honor from every threat, from outside as well from inside the country." Indonesia's "urgent strategic interests" include: fighting and overcoming the international terrorist threat; overcoming the threats and disturbances of armed separatism; counter radicalism; solve communal conflict and help rehabilitation; overcome and prevent international crime; assist civil government (local government).

¶34. (C) Among the "general policy descriptions" Cholik described to fulfill these interests were improvement of TNI professionalism, developing national strategic industries, establish of early warning capability, and develop the "minimum regular force, reserve and supporting forces." Procurement of weapons should correspond to actual and potential threats, the GOI political directive that TNI develop the "minimum essential force" necessary to address them, and the capabilities of national defense industries.

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¶35. (C) Weapons procurement priorities for the TNI Army are purchase of arms and tactical vehicles; human rights simulator for shooting training; and engineering equipment. For TNI Navy DEPHAN prioritized patrol craft; transport ships; and corvettes. Air Force procurement priorities are maritime patrol aircraft; transport aircraft; and radar. For the TNI generally, DEPHAN prioritizes counterterrorism equipment. Cholik noted that "international terrorism is the enemy of all the world community and must be fought together by the international community," noting that terrorism had become a threat to the safety of the nation and a threat to democracy and civil society. He described the counterterrorism units within TNI and POLRI and the role of the Counterterrorism desk within the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Security and Legal Affairs (MENKOPOLHUKAM).

¶36. (C) A/S Hillen expressed interest in further discussion of Indonesian strategic thinking and for the Indonesian delegation to expand its description of the threat environment. Indonesia's focus on maintaining the country's territorial integrity was clear, but with the end of the conflict in Aceh, what concerns did Indonesia have in addition to Papua? A/S Hillen asked whether the government would own national strategic industries or did the GOI contemplate private/public ownership? A/S Hillen noted that BG Cholik had described weapons procurement priorities for each service; based on U.S. experience, combined procurement programs had benefits.

¶37. (C) Purwanto replied that despite the costs associated with national strategic industries -- which compete with other priorities for national resources -- Indonesia "as an independent country wanted to be as independent as possible" and meet its own needs. He noted that Indonesia had such industries, but the larger among them needed assistance. Also, for economic reasons -- Indonesia had 36 million unemployed -- Indonesia needed to restore its economy and sourcing defense materiel in Indonesia would assist. Further development of these industries would also provide experience and allow creativity.

¶38. (C) Of the threats facing Indonesia, separatism is the most important, followed by "infiltration" of the country for political reasons and economic reasons (e.g., illegal logging or smuggling), Purwanto explained. The potential remained for "horizontal conflicts," a third type of threat, because of political or economic reasons (competition for economic resources). A fourth threat, according to Purwanto, was the accessibility of "ideas" made possible through globalization: individuals could become radicalized through exposure to foreign ideas; terrorism, for example, had been built up because of foreign ideas. Fifth, natural disasters and pandemic diseases that "appeared inexplicably" in Indonesia posed threats, too. Sundawan, from the National Intelligence

Service (BIN), added that a potential threat could arise from competition over natural resources in the sea; Indonesia needed to strengthen the Navy to protect from illegal fishing and other attempts to take Indonesian resources. He added that Indonesian sovereignty over its outer islands remained problematic and the GOI needed to take measures to exercise/demonstrate sovereignty there. Strategic planning for counterterrorism remained important, and intelligence exchanges and information sharing could assist in this effort. Indonesia needed U.S. assistance to improve professionalism, although interoperability remained difficult, Sundawan concluded.

Moving the Mil-Mil Relationship Forward

¶39. (C) In concluding, A/S Hillen underscored the value of the opportunity for the two delegations to learn from each other during the day's meetings. He proposed several principles that Indonesia and the U.S. could follow as they moved forward:

- 1) Keep up momentum, talk often, let the political system know that we are talking;
- 2) Maintain transparency; exchange information on what is happening in the field;
- 3) Find good news, package it, sell it to build support for a continuation of programs;

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4) Work toward interoperability -- to facilitate Southeast Asian security cooperation, PKOs, and to enable our two democracies to help solve problems;

5) Work to find common approaches to global problems -- for example, energy, freedom of movement, Iran and DPRK non-proliferation; the U.S. and Indonesia will build understanding of each other by work together on such issues; this may involve some risk-taking as we find common approached; we need to become "entrepreneurs" in this;

6) Achieve concrete results to demonstrate that cooperation pays dividends; as a practical matter, when the Secretary visits Indonesia soon we should have results we can deliver to demonstrate we have moved forward and crossed a threshold.

¶40. (C) Purwanto seconded the recommendation that the U.S. and Indonesia should maintain momentum. This first pol-mil meeting provided a good start. Thanking the U.S. delegation, he said that bilateral relations had "never been better" and that Indonesia was now duty-bound to fulfill the promise made possible by the window that the U.S. had opened.

¶41. (U) A/S Hillen cleared this cable.
PASCOE